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ABSTRACT
In central Texas, an increasing urban and environmental demandfor water, coupled with limited supplies in the Edwards Aquifer,
collided with the legal right of landowners to pump an unlimited
amount of groundwater. There clearly was not enough water in the
Aquifer to meet current and future needs. In response to this water
crisis, the Texas legislature created the Edwards Aquifer Authority
and gave it extensive regulatory power to control pumping and to
reallocate water through market mechanisms. Water marketing
offers a means to minimize conflicts over the reallocation of water
from lower economic valued agricultural uses to higher valued
domestic, industrial, environmental and recreational uses. This
article outlines a conceptual framework for a market-based water
reallocation system and then applies this framework to the Edwards
Aquifer region. The article suggests that there is a strong willing-
ness on the part of stakeholders in the Edwards region to use
markets to reallocate water and proposes an approach to encourage
market development.
I. INTRODUCION
Texas has made Faustian choices in allocating and managing water
in the Edwards Aquifer. The laissez-faire capture rule adopted by the Texas
Supreme Court' and followed by the Texas Legislature' minimized political
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1. Under the Texas water law of "absolute ownership/capture," pumping is
unregulated and landowners are allowed to withdraw as much groundwater from beneath
their land as they can capture. In the exercise of this right there is no liability absent malice,
willful waste, or subsidence. See Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex.
1904); City of Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955); Smith-Southwest
Indus. v. Friendswood Dev. Co., 576 S.W.2d 21 (rex. 1978); City of Sherman v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (rex. 1983).
2. The Texas Legislature codified this common law rule of capture by expressly
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conflicts over governmental regulation of water pumping but it left the
Edwards Aquifer subject to uncontrolled and harmful pumping.3 Although
the capture rule has been widely criticized4 the Texas Supreme Court has
consistently turned aside reform efforts and has deferred to the legislature
to develop rules for groundwater protection.5
As a consequence of the capture rule the Edwards Aquifer was
treated as a common pool resource,6 resulting in distribution and supply
scarcity and posing environmental risks to the endangered plants and
animals living in the springs flowing from the Aquifer 7 These risks became
very apparent in 1989 and 1990, when a combination of hot summers,
drought conditions and excessive pumping significantly decreased flows
recognizing the rights of landowners in underground water. See VENON'S TEXAS CODE ANN.
§ 52.002 (West 1994), repealed by Acts of 1995,74th Leg., ch. 933, § 6 (effective Sept. 1,1995;
now codified at TEXAs WATER CODE ANN. § 911.021(a) (West 1997).
3. The capture rule applies to percolating water and not to underground streams or the
underflow of rivers. See Bartley v. Sone 527 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e); Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235,238 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989, writ denied); TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 911.021(a) (West 1997).
4. For trenchant articles See Joe Greenhill & Thomas Gee, Ownership of Groundwater in
Texas: The East Case Reconsidered, 33 TEX. L REV. 620, 629 (1955) (urging Texas courts and
Texas Legislature to adopt rules prohibiting malicious waste of water); Corwin Johnson, Texas
Groundwater Law: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1017 (1982) (discussing
wastefulness of absolute ownership of percolating groundwater); Corwin Johnson, The
Continuing Void in Texas Groundwater Law: Are Concepts and Terminology to Blame, 17 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1281 (1986); Karen Morris, The Stagnation of Texas Groundwater Law: A Political v.
Environmental Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493 (1990); Eric Behrens & Matthew Dore, Rights
of tandowners to Percolating Groundwater in Texas, 32 S. TEX. I REV. 185 (1991); Lana Shadwick,
Note, Obsolescence, Environmental Endangerment, and Possible Federal Intervention Compel
Reformation of Texas Groundwater Law, 32 S. TEx. L. REV. 641 (1991); David Todd, Common
Resources, Private Rights and Liabilities: A Case Study on Texas Groundwater Law, 32 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 233 (1992); Jana Kinkade, Compromise and Groundwater Conservation, 26 ST. B. TEX
ENVTL LJ. 230 (1996).
5. In upholding the constitutionality of the Edwards Aquifer Authority, the Texas
Supreme Court reaffirmed it's preference for legislative rather than judicial resolution of
groundwater problems. See Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation
Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618,619 (Tex. 1996).
6. The often-unappreciated side effect of the absolute ownership or capture rule is that
current well owners are not protected from excessive pumping by other landownem See Pecos
County Water Control & Improvement DisL No. I v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503,505 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In essence, Texas groundwater is a common pool
resource because it is open to any landowner who cannot exclude any other landowner from
access and unlimited use. For a discussion of the allocation dilemma of common property
resources, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
7. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1998); Endangered and
Threatened Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1998). The Comal and San Marcos springs are home to
five endangered or threatened species: the Fountain Darter, the San Marcos Gambusia, the
Texas Wild Rice, the Texas Blind Salamander, and the San Marcos Salamander.
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in the Comal and San Marcos springs. In order to protect the aquatic plants
and animals that rely on springflows, the Sierra Club filed a federal lawsuit
under the Endangered Species Acte to regulate the amount of water that
municipal, industrial, military and agricultural users could pump from the
Aquifer.9 In January 1993, U.S. District Judge Lucius Bunton ruled in favor
of the Sierra Club and gave the Legislature until May 31,1993, to develop
a satisfactory plan to protect the endangered and threatened species, or face
federal regulation of the Edwards Aquifer.10 He declined to issue a final
order until the State of Texas had the opportunity to address the allocation
issues under state law.
In response to the specter of federal regulation, the Texas
Legislature again made a Faustian choice and opted for state rather than
federal regulation of the Aquifer. The 73d Legislature enacted Senate Bill
1477, creating the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Authority), one day before
Judge Bunton's deadline."
In addition to regulating water withdrawals, the Authority must
also manage the conflicts between urban, agricultural and environmental
interests and uses through a demand management program. The
Authority has a number of management options for meeting increasing
water demands, including conservation, drought management, reuse,
enhanced recharge methods, new surface water sources and the transfer of
water through market mechanisms. 4
This paper examines the efficacy of water marketing as a method
for reallocating water to meet increasing demands and for resolving
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1998).
9. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1,
1993). When springflow decreased to a point that harms the endangered and threatened
species, this constituted a "take" under § 9 of the ESA.
10. Id. at 2-3.
11. Fora history of this dispute see Eric Albritton, The Endangered Species Act: The Fountain
Darter Teaches What the Snail Darter Failed to Teach, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1007 (1994).
12. See Act of June 11, 1993, 73d Leg., RS. ch. 626,1993 TEx GEN. LAWS 2350, amended by
Act of May 29,1995,74th Leg., R.S. ch. 261,1995 TEX SESS. LAW SERV. 2505 (West) (current
uncodified Senate Bill 1477 [hereinafter S.B. 1477].
13. Conflicts result from (1) concerns over the preservation of irrigated agriculture and
the economic and social consequences in these farming areas with few profitable alternatives;
(2) increasing municipal water demands in the San Antonio Metropolitan area; (3) the need
for water to support the military bases in San Antonio; (4) protection of environmental
amenities and recreational activities dependent on springflows; (5) the interdependency
between surface and groundwater flows; and (6) spring flows contributing to water for
downstream water right holders.
14. For a discussion of options see infra notes 63-76.
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conflicts over water use in the Edwards Aquifer."5 A framework for a
market-based reallocation system is suggested, and the paper reports on
results of a transaction-willingness survey of major pumpers in the
region.1' Finally, the paper discusses barriers to the reallocation of water
through market mechanisms.
II. THE EDWARDS AQUIFER SETTING
The Edwards Aquifer provides the economic lifeblood for a 13
county region in south central Texas, extending some 176 miles from
Brackettville in Kinney County to Kyle in Hays County (see Figure 1).
Including its drainage area, the Aquifer region covers 8,000 square miles
and serves as the primary source of water for approximately 1.3 million
people. 7 Counties in the western portion are rural with agriculture as the
primary land use and economic activity. In contrast, Bexar, Comal and
Hays counties in the central and eastern portion of the region are urban
and rely on the water for municipal, industrial, environmental and recrea-
tional purposes.s Given this diversity, the people who live in the region
have extremely divergent interests in the way the Aquifer is managed.
15. Market transfers are predicated on consensual bargaining between conflicting parties
where price is an information rich signal about scarcity that drives the parties to settlement.
A water market is an institutional structure designed to facilitate the transfer of rights and
titles to ownership in water or rights or in rights to use water. For more extensive literature
on water marketing see Ronald Kaiser & Michael McFarland, A Bibliographic Pathfinder on
Water Maeting, 37 NAT. RESOURCE J. 4 (1997).
16. The survey included major irrigators, municipalities, and industrial water users in
the Edwards Aquifer region. Lists of individuals, companies, and agencies pumping more
than 18 million gallons of water per year from the Edwards Aquifer were obtained from the
Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD) and the Texas Water Development Board
(TWDB). Interviews were completed with 105 pumpers consisting of 28 irrigators, 38
municipalities and 39 industries in Bexar, Comal, and Hays counties. The survey also
provided data for a master's thesis. See Laura Phillips, Barriers to Water Marketing: Opinions
of Major Pumpers on Water Transfer Issues in the Edwards Aquifer Region (1996)
(unpublished master's thesis, Tex. A&M U., College Station) (on file with author).
17. The San Antonio metropolitan area is home to approximately one million people and
the Aquifer is the sole source of drinking water for the tenth largest metro area in the nation.
See EDWARDS UNDERGROUND WATER DIsTRIcT, EDWARDS UNDERGROUND WATER Dsmicr 2,
9 (1992) [herinafter EUWD].
18. SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM, THE CASE FOR NEW LEGISLATION FOR THE EDWARDS
AQUIFE 48 (1993) [hereinafter SAWS).
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A. Aquifer Hydrogeology
General features of the Edwards Aquifer hydrogeology are well
known and have been widely publicized. 9 Due to its limestone
composition and its rapid recharge rate, the Aquifer is extremely
transmissive, making it susceptible to rapid water level changes caused by
pumping and drought." The Aquifer is a single strata system and any
recharge, pumping, or spring discharge affects water levels across the
entire Aquifer.
21
The Aquifer is a network of drainage, recharge and storage areas
consisting of three distinct regions: the Edwards Plateau, the Balcones Fault
Zone and the Coastal Plain (see Figure 1). The Edwards Plateau,
encompassing some 4,400 square miles, is the catchment and drainage
basin of the Aquifer. Surface water in the form of rainfall, runoff and spring
flow from the Plateau is funneled into streams that flow across the recharge
area where water penetrates the ground and replenishes the Aquifer. Since
most aquifer recharge occurs through streambeds, this funneling effect is
an important function of the drainage area. '
South of the drainage area lies the Balcones Fault Zone, or the
recharge zone. It is approximately 1,500 square miles, and includes parts
of Kinney, Uvalde, Medina, Bexar, Comal, and Hays counties.' In this area
many closely spaced, nearly vertical faults occur along the relatively
narrow Balcones Fault Zone, exposing fractured Edwards Limestone at the
land surface.2 As the streams originating in the Plateau cross this zone,
much of their flow percolates through the streambeds into the aquifer.r2 All
major streams in the region, except the Guadalupe River, lose water to the
aquifer.
19. The Edwards Underground Water District produced and distributed a report
outlining the geology, water uses and economic growth in the Edwards Aquifer Region. See
generally EUWD, supra note 17.
20. See SPBCIAL 0MrT ON THE EDWARDS AQUI9R, COMM REPORTTOTE72NDLEGM
50 (1991) [hereinafter SCEA).
21. Changes in aquifer well levels reflect changes in pressure within the confined zone
of the aquifer-not the actual movement of water underground. For this reason, recharge
events raise well levels essentially instantaneously across a wide area. Correspondingly,
pumpage at one site quickly affects well levels miles away. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 11.
22. Id. at 8.
23. See EUWD, epra note 17, at 6-7.
24. Id. at 7. Except during flooding, streams flowing from the western part of the Plateau
lose most of their water to recharge When streamflow exceeds the recharge rate, water flows
in rivers to the Coastal Plain.
25. About 85 % of the recharge occurs where the numerous rivers and creeks cross the
recharge zone. SCEA, supra noter20, at 49.
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Directly south of the recharge zone lies the Edwards Coastal Plain,
which is the Aquifer's artesian/reservoir area. It is approximately 2,100
square miles and includes parts of Kinney, Uvalde, Medina, Bexar, Comal,
and Hays counties.' The groundwater in this area moves generally east
and then northeast, toward the spring openings.' The highest yielding
wells are in the artesian zone along a relatively narrow band from near San
Antonio northeastward through New Braunfels to San Marcos. Wells in
this band commonly yield 6,000-7,000 gallons per minute.'
Average annual recharge to the Edwards equals 640,000 acre-feet
with an historical range from 43,000 to over 2 million acre-feet. As long as
the recharge rate equals or exceeds the pumping rate, the Aquifer remains
in equilibrium, and wells and springs do not dry up.
A "bad water line," which separates high quality water from
brackish to saline water, defines the southern edge of the reservoir area.
Movement of this bad water line could jeopardize the quality of
springflows at Comal Springs and San Marcos Springs, which lie
approximately three miles from the boundary, respectively. Degradation
of the springs' water quality could result in the loss of aquatic biota within
the springs of the Aquifer.
B. Water Uses
Water from the Edwards Aquifer is the critical resource that has
supported economic growth and development in south central Texas.'
Over the last 40 years, population growth, industrial development and
agricultural expansion have increased the demand for water, exacerbated
the political tensions between urban, rural interests and complicated the
management of the Aquifer. San Antonio grew from 200,000 in 1940 to 1.1
million in 1990, and this growth is expected to continue.3 The population
26. Id.
27. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 8,11,17. There are five springs in the Edwards Aquifer
region: Leona (Uvalde), San Antonio and San Pedro (San Antonio), Comal (New Braunfels),
and San Marcos (San Marcos). If there were no pumping from the aquifer, in the long run
these spring discharges would still (after some time lag) exactly offset the aquifers recharge.
However, pumping rates have continued to increase rapidly, and are projected to continue
increasing as urban growth in and around San Antonio continues.
28. See EUWD, supra note 17, at 7. A well located 15 miles south of San Antonio in this
artesian zone and used by a catfish farm flowed at the rate of 48,000 acre feet per year, the
equivalent of 25% of San Antonio's total annual usage.
29. The settlement history of the area is closely tied to the springs that flowed from the
Edwards. The first well was drilled into the Edwards in 1865 and by 1900, wells became the
major suppliers of water. This is as true today as it was 100 years ago. See EUWD, supma note
17, at 4.
30. See id. at 9.
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of the Edwards Aquifer region is expected to increase to approximately 2.3
million by 2020, with the highest concentration of people living in Bexar
County. 1 This population growth will increase the demand for Edwards
Aquifer water.
Pumping rates have mirrored population growth. Annual
pumping from private wells has more than tripled since 1940 to an
estimated 540,000 acre-feet in 1990.' Water resource planners project that
in the next 25 years water demand could exceed 850,000 acre- feet per year
and that mining of the Aquifer could begin by the year 2000.
While water use patterns vary through the region, about 43 percent
of the water is taken by irrigators and ranchers in Bexar, Medina and
Uvalde counties and 47 percent is used by municipal, military and
industrial users in San Antonio? Farmers in Uvalde and Medina counties
irrigate more than 82000 acres and irrigation pumping rates have increased
31. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 52.
32. SCEA, supra note 20, at 9-29.
33. See EUWD, supra note 17, at 9.
34. See SCEA, supra note 20, at 11-12. The United States Geological Service (USGS)
calculates pumpage and presents the values by county and use category. The 1988 annual
pumpage rates and the 1978-1988 maximum annual pumpage rates, as calculated by the
USGS, are presented in the tables below.
1988 Pumpage Rates (in 1000s of acre-feet).
Municipal Rural Domestic
COUNTY Military Industry Irrigation Livestock OITAL
Kinney 0 0 1.0 0.2 1.2
Uvalde 5A 0.7 107.8 2.5 116.4
Medina 6.2 0 75.3 0.7 82.2
Bexar 250.8 7.5 18.5 36.1 302.9
Comal 12.8 9.1 0.2 0.7 22.8
Hays 11.1 1.5 0.1 1.7 14.4
TOTAL 286.3 18.8 192.9 41.9 539.9
Maximum Annual Pumpage Rates: 1978-1988 (in 1000s of acre-feet).
Municipal Rural Domestic
COUNTY Military Industry Irrigation Livestock TOIAL
Kinney 0 0 1.7 0.2 1.9
Uvalde 5.8 0.7 133.2 3.2 142.9
Medina 6.2 0 75.3 0.8 82.3
Bexar 252.8 11.8 18.8 37.2 319.8
Comal 13.6 9.4 0.4 0.7 24.1
Hays 11.1 1.9 0.9 3.0 16.9
TOTAL 288.7 23.8 192.9 45.1 587.9
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822% from 1958 to 1989:6 In the center of the region, San Antonio is the
largest city in the United States that relies solely on a single aquifer for its
water supply.' Municipal and industrial pumping rates in Bexar County
nearly doubled from 1958 to 1989.'
Further to the east, the Comal and San Marcos springs are
important recreational and environmental resources that have helped the
region develop into a popular tourist destination. ' The San Marcos springs
are a designated critical habitat for the Edwards Aquifer endangered
species?' If pumping continues at the currept rate, the endangered species
living in the Aquifer region are at risk of being harmed.'
The growth of the region's population and economy continues to
drive the increasing demand for groundwater. Due to the nature of the
Edwards, it will always be subject to very rapid draw down whenever
rainfall is below normal and pumping rates increase. The region has now
reached the point that, if pumping from the aquifer remains unlimited,
average long-term extractions will exceed the average long-term recharge.41
35. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 52.
36. See EUWD, supra note 17, at2,9.
37. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 52.
38. The Edwards Aquifer also affects surface water levels in Comal and Hays counties.
Approximately thirty percent of the base flow of the Guadalupe River is supplied by the
Springs under normal non-drought conditions, and in times of drought the Springs provide
up to seventy percent of the base flow. See SAWS, supra note 18, at 10-17.
39. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO -91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1,
1993); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11-12 (1993). The Springs are vital to maintaining the habitat of the
Fountain Darter (Etheostoma fonticola), a one-inch long fish which lives in stream-floor areas
covered with aquatic plants, both at and downstream of Comal and San Marcos Springs; the
Texas Blind Salamander (Typhlomolge rathbuni), a species of salamander (perhaps the same
as the San Marcos Salamander) which lives in the Aquifer itself and quite possibly in its
springs; the San Marcos Gambusia, a small fish that lives in shallow water of a constant
temperature, partially shaded by overhanging trees in the San Marcos River, and Texas Wild
Rice (Zizania texana), a giant grass found in limited regions of the San Marcos River. The
Springs are also home to the San Marcos Salamander (Eurycea nana), a threatened species.
40. According to data from the San Antonio Water System in order to guarantee
springflows of at least the long run average (210,000 AF) and continuous flow during a
reurrence of the drought of record, regional pumping would have to be reduced to 200000
AF/year--38% of the 1985 pumping level. In order to guarantee springflows of approximately
the long run average and the annual minimum during a drought (23,000 AF in 1956), regional
pumping would have to be reduced to 250,000 AF/year-48% of the 1985 pumping level. At
that annual minimum, however, Comal Springs could actually be dry for part of a year. See
SAWS, supra note 18, at 24.
41. Id. at 112.
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C. The Regulatory Context
The Edwards region has a history of conflict over the use of water.
The establishment of the Edwards Aquifer Authority is the culmination of
an evolutionary process to remove the exploitive incentives in Texas
groundwater law. Bon of economic, legal and political conflict and driven
by the specter of drought, the Authority is the first serious attempt in Texas
to regulate and allocate groundwater. The following discussion briefly
outlines the movement from the capture rule to regulation of groundwater.
1. The Capture Rule
In 1904, the Texas Supreme Court in Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v.
Easte found the movement of groundwater "so secret, occult and concealed
that an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them
would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would, therefore be
practically impossible."' In following this line of reasoning the Court
adopted the English rule of absolute ownership, granting landowners the
right to withdraw as much groundwater from beneath their land as they
capture. In the absence of malice, willful waste or subsidence this capture
right is absolute and unqualified." Under a capture paradigm,
groundwater is legally pigeonholed into such categories as percolating
water,40 underground streams, and underflow of surface streams' 7 While
describing the interconnected nature of surface and groundwater, these
42. Houston &T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (1904). Impressed by the logic of the 1843
English case of Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (iX. 1843) the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the rule of capture.
43. Id. at 280 (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294,314 (1861)) (emphasis added).
44. Facially, these exceptions seem to be major constraints to landowner abuse. Yet, as
applied by Texas courts they are not limitations on wasteful exploitation. For example, in City
of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasonton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1995), the Texas Supreme Court
refused to find "waste" even though seventy-four percent of the 10 million gallons per day
of groundwater that was pumped and transported through surface channels was lost to
evaporation and bank seepage. The fact that very little, if any, of the water was put to
beneficial use did not matter to the Court. d at 802. Further, in Pecos County Water Control
& Improvement Dist. No. I v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ
ref'd n.r e.) the Court allowed irrigators to overpump the aquifer and dry up the springs that
contributed to surface water flow at Comanche Springs.
45. See Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d 754,760 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (noting that percolating groundwater does not pertain to underground streams or water
flowing in a defined underground channel).
46. Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. App-Austin 1989, writ
denied). Groundwater is presumed to be percolating and therefore subject to the absolute
ownership rule. See Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273,278 (1927).
47. See TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (West 1971) (declaring state ownership in
the underjlow of every flowing river).
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categories are at the apex of a disjointed legal system that subjects
percolating water to absolute ownership while underground streams and
the underftow of surface streams are subject to the prior appropriation
system. Taken to its logical legal extreme, a landowner has a legal right to
suck his neighbors' well dry, so long as the water is percolating water, but
is constrained if the water is from an underground stream or from
underflow of a surface stream. This rule promotes a race to the bottom of
the aquifer and is economically and environmentally unsound.
Although advances in hydrology have answered many of the
unknowns about groundwater movement, the Texas Supreme Court has
consistently turned aside challenges to the capture rule and has deferred
to the legislature to develop rules for groundwater protection.' In response
to this deferral, Texas landowners have zealously guarded the capture rule
and have successfully turned back significant legislative attempts to limit
groundwater pumping.49 The message is clear-politics and political
rhetoric trump science. The political and economic totem of private
property rights in groundwater is so entrenched in the Texas landowner
and legislative psyche that any proposed change provokes heavy political
opposition. Preaching the message of "private property rights" in
groundwater has become a secular religion for many Texas landowners.
As a result of this political and legal stalemate, Texas remains a
jurisprudentially anomaly where groundwater and surface water allocation
rules stand in stark contrast to commonly accepted principles of hydrology.
With the exception of the regulatory authority granted to the Edwards
Aquifer Authority and to the Houston-Galveston Subsidence District,
Texas clings to this vestige of the past. Legislative efforts to protect and
manage groundwater resources have focused on the creation of
underground water districts.
2. Underground Water Districts: Planning Giants, Regulatory Dwarfs
In contrast to the unified regulatory system for surface water, the
Texas Legislature has followed a decentralized approach to groundwater
48. The Court has followed the East rule in City of Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 276
S.W.2d 798 (1955); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.
1978); and most recently in City of Sherman v. Public Util. Comm'n 643 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.
1983).
49. See Karen H. Norris, Comment, The Stagnation of Texas Ground Water Lam: A Political
and Environmental Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY'S L. J. 493, 494 (1990) ("Texas landowners... have
successfully avoided any legislative or judicial action intended to limit groundwater
pumpage."); Stephen E. Snyder, Comment, Ground Water.Management: A Proposal for Texas,
51 TM L. Ray. 289,317 (1973) ("Tolitical opposition from groundwater users will probably
remain the most formidable obstacle to adopting an effective groundwater conservation
program.").
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regulation and has deferred management to local districts.' °
Notwithstanding the fact that excessive groundwater withdrawals are a
statewide problem,'1 the responsibility for creating districts and managing
aquifers resides with local voters.' Problems of self interest, limited
funding, local politics and the self-limiting nature of these districts prevent
meaningful management and protection of groundwater resources.5'
Essentially, the legislature has passed the buck to local communities, and
the local response to the groundwater management has been slow and
uneven. Indeed, the Texas legislature has moved in "strange and
mysterious ways" in not removing this anomaly and in not preventing the
mining of the states' groundwater resources.
In one sense, underground water districts are planning giants and
regulatory dwarfs. They have extensive power to study, report,
50. In 1949, under authority of the conservation amendment of the Texas Constitution,
TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 59, the legislature provided for the creation of Underground Water
Conservation Districts. See generally TEx WATER CODE ANN. ch. 52 (West 1971) repealed by Acts
of 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 933, § 6, eff. Sept. 1,1995.
51. Aquifer mining has been identified as a problem in a number of Texas water plans.
For a recent iteration see generally TbxAS WATER DEv. BD., WATER FOR TExAS-TODAY AND
TOMORROW (1990).
52. TExAS WATER CODE ANN. § 51.013-074 (West 1971).
53. From the very beginning& criticisms over the localized control and limited authority
of districts were well known to the Texas legislature. See Edward P. Woodruff, Jr. & James
Peter Williams, Jr., Comment, Authority for "Texas Groundwater District Act", 30 TEX. L Rs'.
862, 866 (1952) ("The act falls far short of being a complete independent groundwater code
... it is merely a short appendage to the lengthy chapter on Water Control and Improvement
Districts."); Snyder, supra note 49, at 298 (1973) (despite the gaping holes in the UWCDs
management powers, however, the most serious barrier to effective action is its dependence
on local politics. The district cannot be effective unless local residents, acting through
popularly elected directors, are willing to impose management controls on their over
pumping activities. None of the existing UWCDs have overcome this barrier and none have
imposed production quotas); Corwin Johnson, Texas Groundwater Law: A Survey and Some
Proposals, 22 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 1017,1020 (1982) ("The Edwards Underground Water District
... is broadly authorized to conserve, protect and increase the recharge of and prevent the
waste and pollution of the underground water but regulatory powers needed to implement
those goals have not been conferred upon it.... The main function of this district appears to
be data collection and dissemination."); Corwin Johnson, The Continuing Voids In Texas
Groundwater Law: Are Concepts And Terminology To Blame?, 17 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1281,1282 (1985)
("The legislature has passed the buck to local communities and the response has been slow
and uneven."); Norris, supra note 49, at 501 ("The Texas legislature purports to distribute
considerable power and authority to local groundwater conservation districts; however,
several factors combine to limit their effectiveness."); Lana Shannon Shadwick, Comment,
Obsolescence, Environmental Endangerment and Possible Federal Intervention Compel Reformation
of Texas Groundwater Law, 32 S. TEX L. REV. 641, 677 (1991) ( "In sum, funding and
management of UWCD's illustrates how greed may manifest itself through the vehicle of local
politics.... Admittedly, UWCDs truly epitomize the state's desire to defer regulation to local
areas, but the result is perhaps not what the legislature intended.").
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disseminate and plan but they are limited in their ability to disturb the
capture rule. The Edwards Underground Water Conservation District is a
case in point. It was created in 1959 in response to drought and the
growing water demands in San Antonio with a general mandate to study
ways to conserve, protect and increase the discharge of the underground
water in the aquifer.s The District was never given the power to limit
pumping and although it had the paper responsibility for drought
management planning and could declare the presence of a drought, it was
without authority to manage and control water use during a drought.
Originally the District included five of the six counties in the
aquifer recharge zone but in 1987, Medina and Uvalde counties withdrew
from the District to create their own groundwater districts. Thus, the
jurisdiction, political clout and cooperative planning ability were further
diluted by the flight of these two counties.
After having been weakened by the flight of Medina and Uvalde
counties, and considering its limited enforcement responsibilities, the Texas
legislature put the organization to death when it established the Edwards
Aquifer Authority.'
3. The Edwards Aquifer Authority: A Planning and Regulatory Giant
In response to prompting from Judge Bunton, and to prevent
federal regulation of groundwater pumping, the Texas Legislature
established the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Authority).' The Legislature
created a planning and regulatory institution with sweeping powers to
manage, conserve and protect the aquifer. As might be expected, the Act
is a carefully crafted political compromise incorporating urban, rural,
industrial, environmental and recreational interests,r7 but in many ways it
is tilted to favor rural and agricultural interests.ss As originally structured
citizen representation on the Board underrepresented some groups and ran
54. See KS. ch. 99,1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 173.
55. S.B. 1477, codified as Act of June 11, 1993, RKS. ch 626,1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, §
1.41 (effectively abolishing the EUWD by transferring its assets to the Authority).
56. Id.
57. See Aquifer Dust-Up: How Cities, Farms and Critters Coexist is Our Fight Too, HOUSTON
PosT, Feb. 7,1993, at C2; David Mcl.amore, Endangered Aquifer, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
26,1994, at A41.
58. See S.B. 1477, supra note 55, § 1.29(e) agricultural users fees cannot exceed twenty
percent of municipal and industrial fees; § 1.31(b) (the Authority must maintain all
agricultural water meters at no cost to the farmer); §1.26(2), (4) (irrigators and industrial users
must be treated equally in the critical management plan).
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afoul of the Voting Rights Act," a problem the Texas legislature was forced
to correct in 1995.60
But the legal challenges did not stop there. Soon after its passage,
a consortium of rural interests challenged the constitutionality of the Act,
alleging, inter alia, that the Act deprived landowners of a vested property
right.61 The Texas Supreme Court finally upheld the Act's constitutionality
in June 1996.
Highlights of the Act include:
(1) Users may not withdraw water from the aquifer
without a permit.'
(2) However, users whose wells are for domestic or
livestock purposes and withdraw less than 25,000 gallons a
day do not need a permit.'
(3) A "Pinocchio provision" requires pre-existing
users to apply for permits based on their claimed historical
water usage during the period from June, 1972 to May,
1993."
(4) Preference is granted to pre-existing users over
new users.
5
(5) Pre-existing irrigators are guaranteed two acre-
feet yearly for the maximum number of acres irrigated
during the 1972-1993 time period, however, new irrigators do
not have this guarantee."
(6) Marketing water is allowed provided the transfers
take place within the geo-political confines of the Edwards
Aquifer region.' Irrigators may only market (lease) up to 50
percent of their water, while other permit holders are
allowed to market their entire right.'
59. See State of Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 20 (1994). The Voting Rights Act is
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (enumerating requirement that any voting
qualification, prerequisite, standard or procedure must not abridge voting rights on basis of
race or color).
60. Act of May 29,1995, R.S. ch. 261,1995 TEx. SESS. LAW SERV. 2505 (West 1995).
61. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618
(Tex. 1996).
62. See S.B. 1477 supra note 55, at § 1.15.
63. Id. at §§ 1.16,1.33.
64. Id. at§ 1.16.
65. Id. at§ 1.16.
66. Id. at §1.16(e).
67. d. at § 1.34.
68. Id.
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(7) The Authority may engage in water marketing
either as a transaction facilitator or to retire water from
use.6
9
(8) The Authority must develop a comprehensive
water plan for the region that includes conservation, future
supply development and demand management." In
conjunction with this effort, individual permit holders may
be required to submit conservation and reuse plans.'
(9) In additional to the comprehensive plan, the
Authority must develop and implement a critical
management plan to deal with drought. The plan must
designate discretionary and non-discretionary water uses
and could require reductions in both types of uses.
Municipal, domestic and livestock uses have the highest
priority followed by industrial, crop irrigation, landscape
irrigation and recreation uses.
(10) Driving this planning effort is a limitation on the
amount of water that can be withdrawn from the aquifer.
Aquifer withdrawals are limited to 450,000 acre-feet annually
(400,000 by 2008); withdrawal amounts for all users may be
reduced in order to meet the total aquifer target limits.'
(11) The Authority must ensure that by December 31,
2012, the continuous minimum springflows of Comal and
San Marcos Springs are maintained to protect those
endangered and threatened species to the extent required by
federal law.74
(12) In addition to the water quantity provisions the
Authority is charged with preventing waste or pollution to
the aquifer. The pollution prevention jurisdiction extends to
a five-mile buffer zone outside the Edwards Aquifer.
Pollution regulations must be uniform throughout the
counties within the Authority.'
(13) Smaller scale underground water districts may
co-exist within the boundaries of the Authority so long as
their powers, duties and regulations are not inconsistent with
those of the Authority.'
69. Id. at§ 1.22.
70. Id. at§ 1.25.
71. Id. at§ 1.23.
72. Id. at § 1.26.
73. Id. at § 1.14(b), (c)
74. Id. at § 1.14.
75. Id. at § 1.08.
76. Id. at §§ 1.42,1.43.
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Although the Authority has significant regulatory powers, it
cannot impose taxes and must rely on user pumping fees7 and legislative
appropriations to operate." This may prove to be its "Achilles heel," a
defect perhaps intended by the Legislature to frustrate the Authority's
ultimate purpose.
By late 1996, the Authority began the process of determining the
amount of water to be authorized under individual pumping permits. This
process will carry over for a number of years. During the winter and early
spring of 1997, the Authority experimented with a water transfer program
by brokering the purchase of dry year options from irrigators in Medina
and Uvalde counties."
An increasing water demand resulting from population growth
and a limited Aquifer supply are the twin forces driving the reallocation
imperative. This paper suggests that this reallocation can be accomplished
by voluntarily transferring water between competing users based on a
water-marketing paradigm. The remainder of the paper describes a general
framework for marketing along with the results of a willingness to market
survey of water pumpers conducted in 1995. Since the Authority was not
operating at that time, we theorized that this survey would help gauge the
potential for water transfers and marketing.
III. A MARKET FRAMEWORK FOR REALLOCATING EDWARDS
AQUIFER WATER
Conflict is inherent in the management, allocation and protection
of water and other shared natural resources. When shared resources are
abundant, their allocation is generally free from economic, political, legal,
institutional and geographical tensions. Conflict arises over competition for
scarce resources, or when parties involved in decision making disagree
about actions that have the potential to have negative impacts on
77. The Edwards Aquifer Authority operates on a user pays principle. The Act creating
the Authority gives it the power to levy fees to defray its operational cost. See Act of June 11,
1993, R.S. ch 626,1993 Tsx. GEN. LAws 2350, § 1.29. In 1997, its inaugural year for full scale
operation, the Authority set pumping fees at $11 per acre-foot for municipal and industrial
users and $2 per acre-foot for agricultural users. See Carmina Danini & Jerry Needham,
Edmads Panel Oks New Fees for Agricultural Water Pumpers, SAN ANONIO ERESS-NEWS, June
11, 1997, at IA.
78. Id. The 1996-97 operating budget for the Authority totaled $ 5.2 million. Of this total,
pumping fees paid by users provided about $2.3 million.
79. See discussion infra part TV, C.
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environmental or human health.' In the Edwards Aquifer region conflicts
arise from (1) concerns over the preservation of irrigated agriculture and
the economic and social consequences in these farming areas with few
profitable alternatives; (2) increasing municipal water demands in the San
Antonio Metropolitan area; (3) the need for water to support the military
bases in San Antonio; (4) protection of environmental amenities and
recreational activities dependent on springflows; and (5) the
interdependency between surface and groundwater flows. The status quo
cannot continue. A certain, consistent and predictable supply of water is
not available to meet all of these needs, and a mechanism is needed to
allocate water fairly and efficiently. Water markets can, in part, provide
that mechanism.
A. Benefits of Water Markets
Negotiated water transfers can play an important economic,
political and social role in reallocating scarce water to meet changing
demands. Water marketing is an alternative to a forced reallocation of
water and has the potential to (1) provide water to growing cities 1 (2)
manage drought; (3) provide water for environmental and recreational
80. Examples include: disputes over prohibiting certain uses of national parks and
forests, fish and game hunting regulations and harvest limits, and reallocation of water from
agriculture to municipal uses. More recently, the 1996 Texas drought highlighted the conflicts
arising from water scarcity and illustrated the importance of resolving, in an efficient and
equitable manner, disputes over allocation of a critical natural resource.
81. Most of the water marketing literature describes agricultural-to-urban water transfers
as a means to provide water to growing cities. See, e.g., MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES,
OVERTAPPED OASIS* REFORM OR REVOLUnON FOR WESTERN WATER (1990); NAT'L RESEARCH
CouNcIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WESr:. EMCIENCY, EQurrY, AND THE ENVIRONMEWr 16
(1993); RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SusSIDieS, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989); Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving
Agricultural Water to Cities: the Searchufor Smarter Approaches, HASINGS WEsT-NORTHwEST J.
ENVrL L. & POL'Y, Fall 1994, at 27.
Texas' population is projected to double in the next 50 years, resulting in an increase
in municipal water use and a decline in agricultural water use. Some of this new water for
urban needs will come from agricultural-to-urban transfers. See TExAS WATER Dev. BD.,
WATER FOR TExAS, TODAY & ToMoRRow 3-3 (Tex. Water Dev. Bd. 1990).
82. The California Drought Water Bank demonstrated that water marketing can meet
urban water needs during drought conditions. The Bank was organized very quickly and
provided over 820,000 acre-feet of water in 1991. The $125 acre-foot purchase price for water
was adequate to attract enough sellers and the sales price of $175 acre-foot was attractive to
a number of purchasers. The Bank spent some $100 million on purchases in 1991 and received
$68 million in revenues from purchasers (the difference being accounted for by the unsold
water held in storage in the State Water Project).
A number of studies and reports have chronicled the development and operation of
the California Drought Water Bank. See, e. g., CALIF. DEP'T OF WATER Resources, 1991
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needs," ' (4) promote efficient water use" ' (5) encourage conservationr (6)
DROUGHT WATER Bank (Calif. Dep't of Water Resources 1992); DAvID L MmHELL, WATER
MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: RESOLVING THIRD-PARTY IMPACT ISSUES (Bay Area Economic
Forum, 1993); Richard E. Howitt et aL, A RBErosPBCnvE ON CALIFORNIA'S 1991 EMERGENCY
DROUGHT WATER BANK (Calif. Dep't of Water Resources 1992); RICHARD W. WAHL, WATER
MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST EXPERIENCE, FUTURE PROSPECTS (REASON FOUND., POL'Y
STUDY No. 162,1993); SHARING SCARCTY: GANE AND LSM IN WATER MARKETING (Harold
Carter et al., eds. 1994).
83. A new demand for water is for instream flows that provide for non-consumptive
environmental, recreational and tourism uses. Recreation and tourism drive this demand,
which have become major industries in many western states, rivaling or surpassing
agriculture in gross state revenues. In recent years, organizations have acquired water rights
to protect instream flows for recreational uses. See Paul R. Williams & Stephen J. McHugh,
Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The Next Step in Protecting California Instream Values, 9
STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 132,166-67 (1990).
Apart from the substantial economic values associated with recreational use of water
there is a growing public recognition and demand for maintenance of environmental integrity
that comes from leaving a certain amount of water in place. Changing water use from
consumptive off-stream uses to maintaining a certain instream and estuary freshwater inflow
has become a major priority. See NATL RESEARCH CouNcIL, supra note 81.
A more pragmatic approach to providing water for environmental and recreational
values is to authorize agencies to appropriate water for these purposes through the use of
water transfers. Water in the California Drought Water Bank was purchased by the state
Department of Fish and Game and used to protect environmental values and fisheries during
the 1992 drought year. More than 24,000 acre-feet of water, or 15 percent of the allocation
from the bank, was used to protect environmental and recreational values. See RONALD
KAISER, LEGAL AND INIV NAL BARRiR TO WATER MARKETING IN TEa 46 (Tex. Water
Resources Inst., Technical Report No. 167 1994).
84. From a purely economic perspective, water transfers make good sense. The notion
of valuing water based on its highest and best economic use is captured in the National Water
Commission discussion on the value of water.
The comparison of water values in alternative uses will become increasingly
important in the years ahead as growing demands compete for limited natural
supplies and values in use increase. The opportunities for net gains by better
allocations will be much greater. Not only will efficiency in the design offacilities
be important, but also efficiency in allocation of water itself. Economic values
provide the best general indication of the basic worth of water if appropriate
attention is given to protection of environmental values.
NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POUCmS FOR THE FUrUR 47 (US. Water Resources
Council 1973) (emphasis added). The Commission basically adopted a market-based
paradigm by equating highest use for water with the economists' "efficient allocation" model.
85. Three common models can be found in water conservation strategies; (1) prescriptive
requirements compelling water rights holders to adopt new technology or follow best
management practices, (2) government subsidies to water users enabling them to purchase
new equipment, and (3) market based sales of conserved water. See A. Dan Tarlock, The
Changing Meaning of Water Conservation in the West, 66 NE& L Rsv. 145 (1987).
An incentive-based approach would grant water rights holders permission to sell
trade or market that water saved through conservation practices. California and Oregon allo
for conserved water to be sold. See CAL WATER CODE §§ 1010, 1011(b), 1012 (West Cum
Supp.); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.455 (West 1988 & 1996 Supp.).
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provide an alternative to new reservoir construction; and (7) promote
political and social harmony."7 These benefits are apropos to the Edwards
Aquifer region and can encourage the marketing of water rights. They
become especially important in developing water marketing as part of the
demand management program required of the Authority.
B. Water Market Requirements
Water markets differ from other natural resource commodity
markets for a variety of reasons, including the long tradition of subsidized
water, the concentration of large amounts of public water held by private
entities, the equally long tradition that water must support a wide variety
of collective public values and the distribution impacts on parties who are
not part of the decision process. ' Thus, unregulated markets do not exist
for water transfers,"' as transfers are directed and controlled by state
86. The traditional state response to an increasing water demand and a limited supply
was to augment the supply through construction of additional reservoirs. Throughout the
western states proposals to augment supply face stringent fiscal and political constraints.
Better management is imperative to accommodate increasing demands for consumptive and
non-consumptive uses. Transfers of water from low value agricultural uses to higher valued
municipal uses are becoming the norm rather than the exception. With varying degrees of
enthusiasm, water suppliers, consumers, brokers, legislators and increasingly influential
segments of the environmental community have accepted the premise that water marketing
should be a major component of future western water law policy. See NAT'L RESEARCH
CouNcMt supra note 81, at 2.
The state of Texas recognized the potential of water marketing-the transfer of water
rights from existing uses to new uses at market value-by making this reallocation
mechanism a significant part of state water policy. The 1990 Texas Water Plan suggests that
future municipal water demand can be met by reallocating existing water supplies with
minimal need for new reservoir development. See TEXAS WATER DEV. BD., WATER FOR TEXAS:
TODAY & TOMORROW 4-1 (1990).
87. See Ronald Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and
Legal Analysis, 27 TEx TECH L. REV. 181,183-96 (1996).
88. Third party impacts of water transfers are an important consideration in western
water reallocation. To date most of the literature has focused on identifying the array of
parties and types of impacts from water transfers. The most complete discussion of third party
impacts can be found in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 81 at, 38-69 (1992); See also
Kenneth R. Weber, Effects of water transfers on rural areas: a response to Shupe, Weatherford, and
Checchio, 30 NAT. REsoURcES J. 13 (1990); Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water
Rights Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARiZ. ST. I.J. 681
(1987); Susan Nunn & Helen Ingram, Information, the Decision Forum and Third Party Effects in
Water Transfers, 24 WATER RES. RESEARCH 473 (1988).
89. In theory this type of market would not be regulated or controlled by laws or
institutions except to protect the unfettered freedom of the market. The perfect market
describes an economists' theoretical framework. It is not the economic reality of western water
practices. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 81, at 3; BONNIE SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH,
WATER MARRKEm IN THEORY AND PRACnCE MARKur TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES AND PUBUC
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regulatory agencies.' In reality, water transfers more often resemble
diplomatic negotiations than simple commodity transactions.
Water markets develop when a combination of economic, legal,
institutional and technical factors converge so that buyers can obtain a
more certain, consistent and predictable water supply relative to other
options and sellers realize greater net benefits by transferring the water
than by keeping it in an existing use.91 The classic economic rationale of
gains from trade motivates most water transfers, however, legal, in
stitutional and technical barriers can vitiate transfers.
The success of water marketing in the Edwards Aquifer region will
be determined by: (1) the increasing demand for water driven by
population growth and environmental needs;' (2) the limited availability
PoLcY (Studies in Water Pol'y and Management No. 12, Charles Howe ed., 1987); Victor
Brajer et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and
Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 489, 495-506 (1989).
90. In Texas all transfers of surface water rights require the approval of the Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission. See TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 11.122 (West Supp. 1998);
30 TEX ADIN. CODE § 295.71 (West 1995).
91. For a bibliography on water marketing see Ronald Kaiser & Michael McFarland, A
Bibliographic Pathfinder on Water Marketing, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 4 (1997). For other articles
discussing the economic, legal, technical and institutional conditions necessary for water
markets see, for example, Terry L. Anderson, The Market Alternative for Hauiian Water, 25
NAT. RESOURCES J. 893 (1985); Victor Brajer et aL, supra note 86; H. Stuart Burness & James
Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River, 23 J. LAW &
EcON. 111 (1980); Arthur Chart, To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of Interstate Waters, 29
NAT. ResouRcE J. 529 (1989); Ronald G. Cummings & Vahram Nercissiantz, The Use of Water
Pricing as a Means for Enhancing Water Use Efficiency in Irrigation: Case Studies in Mexico and the
United States, 32 NAT. RESOURC J. 731 (1992); Richard L. Gardner, Institutional Impediments
to Efficient Water Allocation, 5 POL'Y STUD. REV. 353 (1985); Ronald C. Griffin & Fred 0. Boadu,
Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunities for Reform, 32 NAT. REsOURCES J. 265 (1992); KErFH
HIGGINS & JACK BARNETT, WATER RiGHTS AND THEIR TRANSFER IN THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES (1984); Charles Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potentialfor
Water Markets, 22 WATER RE. REsEARCH 439 (1986); Ronald Johnson, The Definition of a Surface
Water Right and Transferability, 24 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1981); Ronald Kaiser, Texas Water
Marketing in the Next Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181,
(1996); Bonnie Saliba, Do Water Markets Work? Market Transfers and TradeOffs in the
Southwestern States, 23 WATER RES. RESEARCH 1113 (1987); RODNuYT. Smi, TRADING WATER:
AN ECONOMIc AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER MARKuMG (1988).
92. Texas' population has doubled in the past 35 years from 9.5 million in 1960 to 19
million today. The State Water Plan predicts that Texas' population will double again in the
next 50 years, increasing to over 36 million residents by the year 2050. See TEXAS WATER
DEvEaOwMENr BOARD, WATER FOR TEXAS--TODAY AND TOMORROW 3-4 (1990).
In the Edwards Aquifer region water is used primarily for irrigation, industrial uses
and municipal uses. Pumping has increased dramatically in all three sectors. Nearly all the
irrigation uses takes place in Medina and Uvalde counties. Since 1966, irrigation use in these
two counties has increased from an estimated 43,0000 acre-feet/yr to an estimated 160,0000
acre-feet in 1990-a 400 percent increase. Municipal pumping has increased with the growth
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of alternative supplies;" (3) undervalued water uses-' (4) a critical mass of
buyers and sellers; (5) available water information;" (6) reasonable
of the regions' population and economy. In the same 1966-1991 time period, all municipal and
industrial use increased from 164,0000 acre feet/yr to 308,000 acre-feet/yr -a 180 percent
increase. San Antonio's water use has increased from 90,000 acre-feet/yr in 1966 to 158,000
acre-feet/y in 1991--a 60 percent increase. It is estimated that total municipal water demand
will roughly double by 2040 from 285,000 acre-feet/yr in 1990 to 566,000 acre-feet in 2040. See
SAWS, supra note 18.
93. Historically, water has been obtained through: (1) appropriating surface water rights
in the basin to which no previous claim has been made; (2) constructing surface water
development projects to capture, store, and transport water for areas in the basin where local
supplies are perceived as inadequate; (3) interbasin transfer of water; and (4) pumping
groundwater. The economic and political difficulty encountered in seeking to justify large-
scale surface water development projects makes the future of this option very dim. In Texas,
complete appropriation of some surface water and mining of groundwater supplies is a
problem. According to data from the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission there
is limited or no water available for new appropriation in the Colorado River Basin; (the
Guadalupe River Basin upstream of Canyon and Coleto Creek Reservoirs; the San Antonio
River Basin upstream from Lakes Medina and Applewhite; the Nueces River Basin upstream
of the Zavala/Dimnmit counties water. Thus, little, if no, surface water is available in the San
Antonio river basin for appropriation. As a result, San Antonio must seek to acquire water
through interbasin transfers, reuse of treated effluent, or purchase of water rights in the
Edwards Aquifer. See TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERvATION CoMM'N, A REGULATORY
GuIDANcE DOCuMENT FOR APIUCATIONS TO DIvET, STORE OR USE STATE WATER 19 (March
28,1994).
94. The reallocation of water through a market system is driven by the prospect of
economic gains from transferring water to a location, season or purpose of use in which it
generates higher net benefits than under the existing use pattern. In other words, if it's
cheaper to obtain water by pumping groundwater or by building a new reservoir than it is
to buy water from another user, then purchases will be forsaken for pumping or dam
building. In spite of claims of water's enormous economic importance, water actually exhibits
a relatively low marginal value. The estimated direct marginal value productivity of irrigation
water falls in the range of $25-75 per acre-foot. See Robert Young, Why Are there So Few
Transactions Among Water Users? 68 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1143,1144 (1986).
95. For a market to function efficiently, no one buyer or seller, or group of buyers or
sellers should have the power to fix the price of water. Monopolistic practices result when one
buyer or one seller can control the market. In economic terms, a "critical mass" is not
numerically defined but simply means that no one party acting alone can affect the price of
water. Applying this concept to water transfers would mean that more than one city
(purchaser) and more than one supplier (farmer, rancher or water district) should be involved
in the market process. See Brajer et al., supra note 89.
96. An important predicate to successful transfer program is the availability of market
information. Data on prices, potential sellers and buyers, delivery conditions and other
market transactions must be available to the parties in order to have an efficient market.
Buyers and sellers must have easy and inexpensive access to this type of information for a
market to work successfully. See Kaiser, supra note 87, at 209-11; 1 LAwRENCE MACDONNEu,
THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER
DEMANDS (USGS Grant Rep. No. 14-08-001-G1538,1990); Victor Brajer et al., supra note 89.
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transaction costs, 7 (7) defined and enforceable rights to water;o (8) minimal
transfer restrictions, (9) public interest reviews; (10) a conveyance
system;1 and (11) institutional promotion.01 (See Figure 2). Most of these
97. Water transfers can be greatly influenced by transaction cost. In economic terms,
transaction costs are the aggregate costs incurred as part of the transfer process that can be
apportioned to buyers, sellers, state or local agencies and institutions, and third parties. They
are the costs associated with making the market system work. Transaction costs are incurred
in searching for trading partners, in application and brokerage fees, in public hearing and
agency reviews, in legal and technical help, in identifying the legal and physical characteris-
tics of water rights.(priority date, point of diversion, consumptive use and other permit condi-
tions), in arranging price, financing and other transfer terms, in satisfying conditions imposed
by state laws, in internalizing externalities imposed on third parties, and in treating, trans-
porting and storage costs. See generally, NATL RESEARCH COUNCILU, supra note 81, at 43;
MACDONNELL, supra note 96, at 43-4; BoNNI CoLEY ET AL, WATER TRANSFER AND TRANS-
ACTION Coss: CASE STUDIES IN COLORADO, NEw MEXIcO, UTAH AND NEvADA 54 (Dept. of
Agric. Econ., Univ. of Ariz., July 1989).
98. Economists argue that defined and enforceable property rights in water are a critical
factor in facilitating market-based transfers. A property rights system that embodies water
ownership, exclusivity, transferability and enforceability can produce an efficient allocation
of water. See generally SMrmT, supra note 91; H=IGGE. & BARNETT, supra note 91; SALIBA & BUSH,
supra note 89; TOM TIE"ENDERG, ENVMONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS ch. 3
(3d ed., 1992).
99. Except for Colorado and Oklahoma, all of the western states require "public interest"
reviews for surface water transfers. These statutes vary considerably in outlining the criteria
for public interest review and in granting regulatory agencies the discretion in defining the
term. Some statutes simply require a public interest review without defining what is meant
by the term. New Mexico, South Dakota, Nevada, and Texas allow a regulatory agency to
rject a transfer application where the transfer is detrimental to the public interest, not in the
public interest, threatens to prove detrimental to the public interest, or is detrimental to the
public welfare. For a discussion of public interest reviews see generally Consuelo Bokum,
Implementing the Public Welfare Requirement in New Mexico's Water Code, 36 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 441 (1997); Kaiser, supra note 87,°at 219-22; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCL, supra note 81, at 255;
Douglas Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocotion and Transfer in the West: Recogni-
tion of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1987).
100. A means of efficiently and effectively moving water from the seller to the new
purchaser must exist. This conveyance is not a problem for surface water transfers if the
purchaser is downstream from the seller. The seller merely uses the natural conduit (the river)
to convey water. The importance of a conveyance system to an effective water market is
illustrated by the states of California and Colorado. Both have elaborate systems for moving
water from the source of supply to the user. California moves water from the northern to the
southern portion of the state-a distance of more than 500 miles. Similarly, Colorado has
developed a system for moving water across the continental divide to serve the growing
population centers on the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains. For a description of the
California conveyance system see JOSEPH SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTiOL OF WATER RESOURCES
679 (2d ed. 1991).
101. Water institutions typically are structured to plan, develop, manage and regulate
water resources. Institutions that have planning and regulatory functions can play a signifi-
cant role in promoting and facilitating water transfers. Planning processes that encourage
transfers as a means of reallocating scarce water resources represent a positive form of state
water policy. For a generally overview of institutional promotion of marketing see Barton
Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectivs on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L REV. 671, 707-23
(1993).
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criteria are theoretically present in the Edwards Aquifer region and the
potential for marketing does exist. Some uncertainty is present regarding
a critical mass of buyers and sellers, information on water availability and
pricing, transfer restrictions and a conveyance system for the water. This
article attempts to answer some of these questions.
IV. WILLINGNESS TO MARKET
Since there is no evidence that groundwater rights were transferred
in the Edwards region before the passage of the Edwards Aquifer Act, this
study sought to determine if a potential exists for water markets based on
a "willingness to transfer profile" of groundwater pumpers. The rationale
is that in the absence of a market, a willingness to transfer is the best
evidence to suggest the potential for markets.
A. Data Collection
Data for this study is taken from telephone interviews with 105
groundwater pumpers who individually extract more than 18 million
gallons of water per year from the Edwards Aquifer."in Due to pending
litigation by some Medina and Uvalde county irrigators, all attempts to
obtain a list of irrigators in these counties were denied. Efforts to obtain a
list under state and federal Freedom of Information Acts were not
successful. For this reason, the scope of the study was limited to Bexar,
Comal, & Hays counties. However, the experimental 1997 Irrigation
Suspension Plan of the Edwards Aquifer Authority in Medina and Uvalde
counties tends to corroborate the findings of this study. We believe that
these large pumpers are more likely than smaller operators to be in a
position to participate in water marketing ventures.
Because this group is not large, we surveyed the entire population.
Twenty-eight irrigators, and representatives of 38 municipalities and 39
industries (n=105) completed the interviews. The value of this study is that
it provides important information regarding major pumpers in the area
who would likely be involved in any water marketing.""
102. The list of individuals, companies, and agencies pumping water from the Edwards
Aquifer were obtained from the Edwards Underground Water District (EUWD) and the Texas
Water Development Board (IWDB). EUWD's lists included irrigators, municipalities, and
industrial water users in Bexar, Comal, and Hays counties that pump 18 million gallons per
year or more.
103. Descriptive statistics and non-parametric analysis of variance were the analytical
tools used in this study. Initial testing showed that the data did not pass the assumption of
homogeneity of variance required in analysis of variance testing. Therefore, a non-parametric,
one-way analysis of variance test (the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test) was
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B. The Transfer Landscape
There is a strong desire on the part of many irrigators and
municipalities for water transfers, and we believe that conditions exist for
the development of water markets in the Edwards Aquifer. Experiences
from other regions of Texas and from other western states suggest that
organized markets in the Edwards Aquifer region will develop in response
to scarcity.s' A willingness to market does not always equate to an actual
market practice.
Pumpers in the Edwards Aquifer region indicated that in varying
degrees they would pursue water transfers (see Table 1). Irrigators and
municipalities exhibited the greatest willingness to engage in transfers.
Nearly 60 percent of the irrigators and 55 percent of the municipalities
indicated some degree of likelihood that they would pursue marketing in
the near future.
All groups thought that some barriers to marketing existed but that
over time these barriers ,would fall. Uncertainties over legal rights to
groundwater and over how to structure transfer agreements were the
major barriers to willingness to engage in transfers, but these were not
insurmountable hurdles preventing water transfers.
employed in the analysis. This test is less stringent when assumptions of normality and equal
variance are violated. The null hypothesis for the Kruskal-Wallis test postulates that there are
no differences between the groups; the alternate hypothesis is that at least one group differs
from the others.
Analysis of variance usually employs a multiple comparison test, such as Scheffd,
Duncan or Tukey. These tests were not applicable here. Instead, the Wilcoxon rank sum test,
which is similar to a t-test but has less stringent assumptions regarding normality and equal
variance, was employed to identify group differences. The null-hypothesis of the Wilcoxon
test is that the populations are identical; the alternate hypothesis is that one of the groups is
different. For a discussion of this statistical procedure see DENNIS E. HINu E ET AL., APPLED
STATsTcS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL ScIENcEs 18,102-24 (1994).
104. See infra notes 127-28.
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Table 1. Likelihood That Respondents Will Pursue Water Marketing In The
Near Future.
LIKELIHOOD Irrigators Municipalities Industries
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Not at all likely 6 21 14 38 20 56
Not very likely 0 0 2 5 1 3
Somewhat likely 5 18 3 8 4 11
Not very likely 5 18 3 8 5 14
Extremely likely 6 21 14 38 5 14
Don't Know 6 21 1 3 1 3
1. Agriculture to Urban Transfers
Edwards Aquifer transfers will most likely move water from lower
valued agricultural uses to higher valued urban and industrial uses. This
is consistent with the dominant trend in western water transactions where
water has moved from irrigation to urban uses?® An analysis of responses
to a number of questions on transfers indicated that there are statistically
significant differences between irrigators, cities or industries in their
willingness to sell water. When asked about selling water for
compensation, 50 percent of irrigators indicated that they would be willing
to sell or lease water if approached by a willing buyer whereas only 22
percent of municipalities and 31 percent of industries were willing to selL'
There exists a potential to move a large volume of water through
transfers, which could provide a major source of water for cities during
times of drought. For example, irrigators who are willing to transfer water
for compensation demonstrated a willingness to transfer relatively large
amounts of water (Table 2). Forty-two percent of these irrigators indicated
that they would sell or lease more than 75 percent of their entitlement.'er
Municipalities and industries who indicated a willingness to sell or lease
105. See supM note 81.
106. There were statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this
question (alpha = .05, critical value (df, 2) = 5.99, chi-square = 10.65, p = .01). Further pairwise
testing showed that irrigators' responses were significantly different than municipalities' (p
= .002) and industries' (p = .017) at the .05 level.
107. This raises interesting questions over the amount of water than can be transferred
since irrigators are restricted from leasing more than 50 percent of the irrigation rights initially
permitted. See S.B. 1477, supra note 55, at § 134(c). Perhaps the legislature was concerned over
a large-scale transfer of agricultural water to cities and sought to protect agricultural users
from themselves and the foibles of the marketplace.
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water were more conservative; 33 percent of municipalities and forty-six
percent of industries would sell 30 percent or less. More than one-quarter
of irrigators and municipalities responded that they "didn't know," which
indicates that these individuals either have not yet given the issue serious
consideration or that they prefer to keep this information confidential.
Table 2. How much of your water right would you be willing to sell or
lease?
SALE Irrigators Municipalities Industries
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
0>30 0 0 3 33 5 46
30>75 4 29 2 22 3 26
75 > 100 6 42 1 11 2 18
Don't Know 4 29 3 33 1 10
2. A Dilemma for Irrigators
We theorized that irrigators would place greater importance on
keeping water in agricultural use than other uses. As posited in the
literature, irrigators may have more at stake in water marketing than just
water; agricultural lifestyle and the social, economic and political fabric of
agricultural communities may be at risk when water is transferred to non-
agricultural uses." We tested irrigators' sensitivity to this issue by asking
108. Positive and negative impacts of water transfers are often expressed in economic,
environmental, recreational, and social terms. Economic effects, measured at the firm or sector
level, include impacts on incomes, jobs and business opportunities that can have positive and
negative contributions on local, regional and state economies. One study found that third-
party impacts, though a valid concern and deserving of attention, were overstated in the
public debate. In this study, the types of crops affected, the level of agricultural production
disrupted, and the resulting employment losses were small compared to the historical
fluctuations within agriculture. An employment loss in agriculture will be offset many times
over by the creation of new jobs in urban areas. See, e.g., Harold Carter et al., eds., supra note
82.
These effects can extend to the fiscal conditions of state and local governments. For
example in La Paz County Arizona, the purchase of water farms (farms with appurtenant
water rights) by one municipality removed 10 percent of the taxable land from its tax base.
This potentially could increase county tax rates and place a heavier burden on remaining
taxpayers. See Susan Nunn & Helen Ingram, Injormation, the Decision Forum and Third-Party
Effects in Water Transfers, 24 WATER RESOURCES RES. 473-480 (1988)].
Social impacts tend to be non-economic, intangible and difficult to measure.
Intangible impacts include changes in; (1) the quality of community life, (2) political
empowerment, (3) connectedness to the land and (4) a sense of community. Rural
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if they would prefer to keep water in agricultural use rather than transfer
it to urban use. Analysis of the irrigator responses indicates that they favor
sales to other ag-users (irrigators and ranchers) more than they favor
transfers to other groups.1" Sixty-four percent of irrigators either favored
or strongly favored transfers to both irrigators and ranchers. Electric power
providers were their second most frequent choice (43 percent), followed by
municipalities (39 percent), industries and government agencies (32
percent).
Since the marketing literature indicated that purely economic forces
might drive the sale or lease of water rights, we asked respondents if they
would be willing to sell water rights to any willing buyer if the price were
right. Nearly half of the irrigators indicated that they would sell water to
the highest bidder.
Thus a number of irrigators are caught on the horns of a dilemma.
They can personally make more money by transferring their water to cities
and industries but in so doing they risk harming their community. This
suggests that there may be a myth and a reality to farmer economic
behavior when it comes to water transfers. The myth may be that farmers
act as economic optimizers in seeking to balance individual and
community interests benefits and costs in transfers and the reality may be
that many act as individual economic maximizers.
One social and economic impact study of possible agricultural to
urban water transfers in Medina and Uvalde sought to measure this
community impact. The study projected that business economic output in
communities, individuals and the courts are taking stands to provide a modicum of legal
protection for an agricultural lifestyle threatened by transfer of water rights. In a celebrated
New Mexico case involving the sale of 75 acre-feet of agricultural water rights to a ski resort,
local irrigators challenged the transfers claiming that it was contrary to the public welfare.
The trial court judge overturned the state engineer's approval of the transfer, finding that
although the proposed ski resort would bring additional jobs that over the long run, the local
inhabitants lose management jobs to outsiders and are relegated to tourism service jobs such
as waiter and maids. The judge's ruling held that greater economic benefits are not always
more desirable than preservation of cultural identity. The trial judge was later reversed by the
New Mexico court of appeals based on the fact that the specific public interest language was
not added until after the application to transfer was filed. See In re Application of Sleeper, No.
RA84-53(c), slip op. (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist., Apr. 16,1985), rev'd, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. App. 1988),
cert. quashed, 759 P.2d 200 (1988).
109. Respondents were asked if they (1) strongly favor, (2) favor, (3) neither favor nor
oppose, (4) oppose, or (5) strongly oppose selling or leasing water rights to certain users
including irrigators, ranchers, municipalities, industries, hydroelectric power providers,
environmental interests, government agencies, or other private interests. To test the
hypothesis, we constructed an "agricultural use" scale (AGUSE). This scale was constructed
by taking the mean responses to preferences for transfers to irrigators and ranchers. A
reliability test (Cronbach's alpha) for this scale was .917, indicating that the scale is very
reliable and that the items are in fact correlated.
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the two counties might decrease by $67 million, that 900 jobs might be lost
and population might decrease by up to 2,200 people.10 A limitation of this
analysis is that it only examined negative community impacts in Medina
and Uvalde counties and did not examine benefits to those communities
receiving the transferred water.'
3. Transaction Assessments-The Hesitant Irrigator & the Willing City
Irrigators may be worried about the economic, environmental and
social consequences to their communities if they transfer water to cities, but
they are less interested in determining and revealing these impacts than are
cities.12 (Table 3). Cities were most convinced that specific impact
assessments should be completed prior to transfer approval, while less
than half of irrigators and industrial respondents held this view."
Respondents were-asked to express preferences as to who should be
responsible for conducting and reviewing the results of impact assessment.
Irrigators tended to favor local control whereas cities and industries
favored state oversight, but the differences between them were small.114
110. BBC RESEARcH & CONSULTING, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACIS OF WATER
TRANSFERS: A CASE STuDY oFTHE EDwARDS AQuiFR XIII-4 (1996).
111. Id., at VI-2.
112. Pairwise comparisons of responses to the questions about economic impact
assessment showed that municipalities' responses were significantly different from irrigators'
(p = .004) and industries' (p = .000). Regarding environmental impact assessment,
municipalities' responses were also significantly different from irrigators (p=.037) and
industries (p = .000). There were also statistically significant differences in responses
regarding social impact assessment between municipalities and irrigators (p = .001). As in
previous pairwise comparisons, these tests of significance were performed at the .05 level.
113. There were statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this
question (alpha = .05, critical value (df,2) = 5.99, chi-square = 16.07, p = .000). Pairwise testing
showed that municipalities' responses were significantly different than irrigators (p = .000)
and industries (p = .001) at the .05 level.
114. Twenty-three percent of irrigators, twenty-five percent of municipalities, and
nineteen percent of industries believed that the Edwards Aquifer Authority should be the
agency primarily responsible for economic impact assessments. Twenty-three percent of
irrigators said that the seller should be responsible, and thirty-one percent of municipalities
favored state government. Twenty-five percent of industries favored local government. There
were no statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this question (alpha
= .05, critical value (df, 2) = 5.99, chi-square = .63, p = .73).
Environmental impact assessments showed a similar pattern. When asked exactly
who should be responsible for the EIS, forty-six percent of irrigators indicated that the
Edwards Aquifer Authority should be responsible, as opposed to twenty-six percent of
municipalities and twenty-seven percent of industries. Municipal and industrial responses
were also high in the state government category (twenty-nine and forty percent respectively).
There were no statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this question
(alpha = .05, critical value (df,2) = 5.99, chi-square = 2.02, p = .37).
Summer 1998]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
The reluctance of irrigators to reveal their participation in water
transfer transactions was also present in the 1997 Irrigation Suspension
Plan.15 Irrigators sought, without success, to have their identities and
payment schedules protected from public disclosure by the Edwards
Aquifer Authority.1
6
Table 3. Types of impact assessments favored by respondents.
ASSESSMENT Irrigators Municipalities Industries
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Economic 13 46 32 86 16 44
Environmental 13 46 31 84 15 42
Social 11 39 27 73 11 31
4. Transaction Oversight and Supervision
While the Authority has the regulatory responsibility for water
transfer oversight,"7 pumpers in the Edwards Aquifer region place varying
levels of importance on the need for transfer oversight. Not surprisingly,
irrigators want little or no oversight over transfers while cities and
industries are willing to accept greater control. Only 39 percent of
irrigators, as contrasted with 50 percent of industries and 89 percent of
municipalities, indicated that some kind of prior approval process is in fact
necessary." Correspondingly, there was no consensus between the groups
surveyed as to who should take on the responsibility of transaction
Respondents seemed less sure about social impact assessments than they were about
the others, but thirty-nine percent of irrigators, seventy-three percent of municipalities and
thirty-one percent of industries believed a social impact assessment should be completed prior
to transfer approval). As was the case for environmental impact assessment, irrigators tended
to favor the Edwards Aquifer Authority (thirty-six percent), whereas municipal and industrial
respondents favored state government (twenty-six and thirty-six percent respectively). There
were no statistically significant differences between groups' responses to this question (alpha
= .05, critical value (df,2) = 5.99, chi-square = .04, p = .98).
115. See infra Part IV.C, for a discussion of this program.
116. Interview with Greg Ellis, General Manager, Edwards Aquifer Auth. in Austin, Tex.
(Oct. 23,1997).
117. While the Act does not explicitly grant the Authority the power to review and
approve permit transfers, this power could be inferred from sections 1.08,1.11,1.15,1.22,1.34
& 1.35 of the Act. See S.B. 1477, supra note 55.
118. There were statistically significant differences between groups' responses to
transaction oversight. (alpha=.05, critical value =5.99, chi square=16.07, p=.000). Pairwise
testing indicated that municipal responses were significantly different than irrigators (p=.000)
and industries (p=.001) at the .05 level.
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oversight. However, forty-five percent of irrigators, thirty percent of
municipalities and thirty-nine percent of industries favored the Edwards
Aquifer Authority as the entity primarily responsible for such oversight
(Table 4).
Table 4. Agency most responsible for transfer approval.
APPROVALS Irrigators Municipalities Industries
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
State 0 0 12 36 3 17
County 2 18 1 3 3 17
City 0 0 2 6 1 6
Groundwater dist. 0 0 3 9 1 6
Edwards Aq. Auth. 5 46 10 31 7 39
Landowners 4 36 2 6 2 11
Don't Know 0 0 3 9 1 6
The willingness of some Edwards Aquifer irrigators, and
municipalities to transfer water in the Edwards Aquifer was reinforced in
1997 by the expression of interest in the Irrigation Suspension Plan
instituted by the Edwards Aquifer Authority. More than 100 irrigators
made offers to participate in the program.
C. THE 1997 IRRIGATION SUSPENSION PLAN
In late-1996 and early-1997, the Authority instituted a water bank,
known as the Irrigation Suspension Plan, as a hedge against a summer
drought.119 Under this voluntary program, the Authority obtained pledges
from selected irrigators in Bexar, Medina, Uvalde, Comal and Atascosa
counties to forgo irrigating crops during the summer of 1997. The
Authority received offers from 117 farmers covering 25,987 acres of
irrigated land. About 95 percent of the offers came from farmers in Bexar
and Medina counties. The Authority used a scoring matrix that included
119. The program used the dry year option as a management tool to reduce irrigation
demand from the Edwards during a drought It is a financial inducement to farmers for
voluntary suspension of irrigation in exchange for a specified payment An agreement would
give a buyer the option to suspend the farmers' irrigation use for a specified drought period.
Municipal and industrial users of Edwards water are potential purchasers of this water. See
G. E. ROTHE COMPANY, INc., A PIwr DRY YEAR OnION PROGRAM To REDUCE EDWARDS
AQuI ER IRRIGATION DEMAND IN 1996, (report prepared for the Edwards Aquifer Liaison
Committee members in Cooperation with the San Antonio Water System and the Guadalupe-
Blanco River Authority, 1996)
Summer 1998]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
price, well location, type of irrigation equipment, types of crops grown and
commitment to grow a dryland crop to winnow the list down to 40
irrigators.'" Ultimately, 40 irrigators were paid an amount ranging from
$40 to $750 an acre to not irrigated about 10,000 acres of land.121 This
program resulted in a theoretical savings of 20,000 acre feet of water, about
half of which would be used to insure minimum springflows and the other
half to be available for pumping.
Some 30 contributing cities, counties, water purveyors and businesses
provided about $2.4 million in funding for the bank.1" Calculations of the
monetary contribution for each purchaser were generally determined based
on their 1995 pumpage as a percentage of total pumping.' Some
contributors, such as the city of Victoria and the Guadalupe-Blanco River
Authority, do not pump from the Aquifer, but are located downstream of
springs that emanate from the Aquifer. They made payments hoping that
the effort would maintain springflows. 2 In exchange for these payments,
contributors to the bank would be allowed to pump 140 percent of their
winter allowance rather than the 130 percent allowed under the drought
stage. That 10 percent difference ranges from 14 million gallons per day for
San Antonio to thousands of gallons per day for smaller cities."
It is difficult to assess the success of this pilot banking program, as
fortuitous summer rains replenished the aquifer and provided much
needed water for farmers. From an agricultural perspective, the program
was very successful because 40 irrigators received windfall payments of
some $ 2.3 million not to irrigate and mother nature provided moisture for
the crops that otherwise would not have been available.
Unknowns further complicate program assessment over aquifer
transmission. Until the geology is better understood, it is difficult to
determine whether a reduction in pumping in Medina and Uvalde
Counties actually produces a corresponding and measurable increase in
water for pumpers in Bexar County. The Authority is attempting to gauge
120. See Jerry Needham, 117 Farmers Interested in Water-for-Cash Swap, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS NEwS, Jan. 11, 1997, at lB.
121. Id.
122. The Authority retained about 3 percent of the $ 2.4 million to cover administrative
costs and the remainder was distributed to 40 farmers. See Chuck McCollough, EAA Plans to
Purchase irrigation Rights from Farmers, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Jan. 29,1997, at 1.
123. Id.
124. See Jerry Needham, No-Irrigation Payments for Farmers Starts: Aquifer Pilot Program
Covers 5 Counties, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEwS, Feb. 7,1997, at 1B.
125. See McCollough, supra note 122.
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the transmissive nature of the Aquifer in Medina County by drilling test
wells to monitor water flow.
12
V. CONCLUSION
The long political war over the management and regulation of the
Edwards Aquifer ended in Austin with the passage of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority Act; what remains are economic, legal and emotional skirmishes
over the nuances of management and the distribution consequences of that
management. The new challenge for Edwards Aquifer stakeholders and for
the Authority will be to find common ground for developing negotiated
solutions to reallocating water where the benefits of cooperation exceed the
rewards of rivalry. A market system, driven by enlightened economic self-
interest and tempered by regulatory oversight to minimize externalities
and balance equity, can provide a mechanism to help meet this challenge.
Water markets require a nexus between legal, institutional, economic
and conveyance factors to insure the transfer of water. While water
scarcity, limitations on use and increasing demand drive the need for
markets, laws and institutions shape markets and determine their ultimate
success. As this paper suggests, these factors are coalescing in the Edwards
Aquifer region so that water marketing paradigm could develop. That
market will undoubtedly be driven by drought and shaped by the Edwards
Aquifer Authority."r The transfer rules and individual pumping permits
that will be issued by the Edwards Aquifer Authority will in great part
determine not only the shape of water markets but also their speed in
developing. It is likely to take five to ten years for staff to review the more
than 900 pending applications for withdrawals from the Aquifer. This
suggests that, absent a drought or some other stimuli, a stable market
transfer system for the Edwards Aquifer region may still be a few years
away.
Based not only on the results of this "willingness to market" study but
also on the experiences with the 1997 Irrigation Suspension Plan, greater
institutional promotion and education may be required to promote the
development of water markets. While the Edwards Aquifer Authority is to
be lauded for leading in the development of the Irrigation Suspension Plan,
126. Interview with Greg Ellis, General Manager, Edwards Aquifer Auth. in Austin, Tex.
(Oct. 23,1997).
127. Experience in the West suggests that water markets have largely been confined to
drought water banks and intraorganization sales. Most states suffer from a dearth of transfers
other than at the intraorganization level, or within the confines of a small geographical scale.
See WATER MARKE'ING-THE NEXT GwNERATION (Terry Anderson & Peter Hill eds., 1997);
Kaiser, supra note 87; SAX Er AL, supra note 100; Barton Thompson, Institutional Perspective on
Water Markets, 81 CAL L REV. 671 (1993). But cf. 1 MACDONNLL, supra note 96.
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the potential for market and regulatory mischief is present when a
regulatory agency seeks to act as a brokerage agency. One way to
overcome this potential problem is for the State Water Bank to assume
leadership in promoting and facilitating market transfers in the Edwards
Aquifer region.' Institutional intransigence and lack of funding seems to
be the major reason that the Bank has not developed to its statutory
potential. Leadership and legislative prompting may energize the Bank to
take a more proactive role in the Edwards Aquifer region.
Market transfers are not an elixir for all of the region's water problems.
However, they provide a means to respond to changing economic,
environmental and social water needs in a way that helps ensure that water
is put to its highest and best use. The Edwards Aquifer Authority has a
number of planning, regulatory and managerial tools in its statutory tool
box that should be used in combination with market transfers to allocate
water in the Edwards in ways that minimize economic, political and social
instability.
Eventually, the region may well face another Faustian choice so that
markets alone will not resolve allocation conflicts. The time may come
when water is so scarce and ecological demands are so great that people
may face the divestiture of tangible lifestyles to protect intangible species.
128. The Texas Water Dev. Bd. has been authorized to establish and administer a bank to
facilitate the transfer of water among willing buyers and sellers. This authority extends to
surface and groundwater as well as water saved through conservation practices. See TEXAS
WATER CODE ANN. §§ 15.701-708 (West Supp. 1998)
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